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Abstract
This paper describes our experience using the interactive theorem prover Athena for proving the
correctness of abstract interpretation-based dataﬂow analyses. For each analysis, our methodology
requires the analysis designer to formally specify the property lattice, the transfer functions, and
the desired modeling relation between the concrete program states and the results computed by
the analysis. The goal of the correctness proof is to prove that the desired modeling relation holds.
The proof allows the analysis clients to rely on the modeling relation for their own correctness.
To reduce the complexity of the proofs, we separate the proof of each dataﬂow analysis into two
parts: a generic part, proven once, independent of any speciﬁc analysis; and several analysis-speciﬁc
conditions proven in Athena.
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1 Introduction
Modern compilers use a variety of dataﬂow analyses, whose correctness directly
aﬀects the correctness of the produced executables. Although the theoretical
foundations of dataﬂow analyses are well understood and described in detail
in popular textbooks [19], many such analyses are presented without a formal
speciﬁcation of the properties they compute and without a correctness proof.
Even when detailed paper-and-pencil correctness proofs are given, they tend
to be very long and mostly tedious. As a consequence, few people ever read
and review such proofs, leading to low conﬁdence in them. We do not want to
underemphasize the importance of such proofs: The ﬁrst author wrote a large
paper-and-pencil correctness proof for a pointer and escape analysis [24], and,
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although diﬃcult, that proof was invaluable in understanding (and correcting)
the analysis design.
The goal of our research is to use advances in interactive theorem proving
to express analysis correctness proofs in a machine-checkable manner. Using
an interactive theorem prover has two advantages. First, it forces the analysis
designer to be precise in the description of the analysis and in the speciﬁcation
of the properties that the analysis computes. Second, the correctness proof
is machine-checkable. Unfortunately, the increased precision and machine-
checkability have the drawback of requiring a signiﬁcant increase in the proof
eﬀort. In addition, many machine-checkable proofs are unnatural and hard to
read. We use the interactive theorem prover Athena [4, 2] because it has the
potential to tackle these problems. One of Athena’s design goals is to allow for
high-level structured proofs written in the same style as the paper-and-pencil
proofs. Athena also achieves signiﬁcant proof automation, both through user-
deﬁned tactics and through the seamless integration of external cutting-edge
automated theorem provers (such as Vampire [26] and Spass [27]).
A dataﬂow analysis computes an analysis fact for each program point;
the analysis fact conservatively models each possible program state at that
point. In our approach, we ask the analysis designer to provide a formal
speciﬁcation of the modeling relation, and a correctness proof, i.e., a proof
that the computed analysis facts satisfy the intended modeling relation. Each
program optimization that uses the analysis results can rely on the modeling
relation. Therefore, we decouple the problem of optimization correctness into
two parts: the correctness of the underlying analysis, and the correctness of
the program transformation. Our work examines only the analysis correctness.
Proving the correctness of an analysis is a daunting task. To simplify it,
(1) we focus on the high-level deﬁnition of the analysis; and (2) we split the
correctness proof into several simpler proofs.
Following classic textbooks [19], we express a dataﬂow analysis as a ﬁxed-
point of a set of dataﬂow equations. Intuitively, the analysis starts with a
special initial analysis fact for the beginning of each analyzed procedure, and
next uses the analysis transfer functions to abstractly interpret [8] the program
statements. The analysis facts belong to a property lattice; in the control ﬂow
join points, the lattice join operator combines the incoming analysis facts.
Given a set of monotonic constraints / transfer functions over a lattice with no
inﬁnite ascending chains, there are well-understood algorithms for computing
the least ﬁxed-point [19]. We consider these ﬁxed-point solvers correct, and
do not prove their correctness. Instead, given a set of transfer functions, we
focus on proving that any set of analysis results (one result for each program
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point) that satisfy the transfer functions also satisfy the intended modeling
relation associated with the analysis.
We separate the analysis correctness proof into a generic part (proven
once, independent of the examined analysis), and three suﬃcient analysis-
speciﬁc conditions. For each new analysis, the analysis designer needs to
prove these three conditions in Athena. The generic part of the proof is a
proof by induction that uses the analysis-speciﬁc conditions in its base case
and induction step. These conditions require that the analysis fact for the
beginning of an analyzed procedure models the concrete state(s) at that point,
and that the abstract interpretation of each instruction preserves the modeling
relation. 1 In general, the analysis-speciﬁc conditions involve the execution of
at most one simple instruction; hence, their proofs are signiﬁcantly easier than
the entire correctness proof, and, hopefully, large parts of these proofs can be
automatic. Still, as the execution of an invoked procedure may involve many
instructions, some sort of user-supplied frame theorem 2 is required in the case
of a call instruction.
Notice that we study the correctness of the high-level analysis speciﬁca-
tion and not the correctness of a particular analysis implementation. Still, if
we have a high-level analysis speciﬁcation, we can automatically generate an
implementation that solves the dataﬂow equations [1].
Contributions: This paper makes the following contributions:
• We present a methodology for doing machine-checkable correctness proofs
for dataﬂow analyses. Our methodology reduces the proof eﬀort by focusing
only on a clear set of high-level analysis-speciﬁc conditions.
• We present our experience using our methodology to prove the correctness
of three related dataﬂow analyses in the interactive theorem prover Athena.
Our proofs are available from
http://www.cag.lcs.mit.edu/∼salcianu/df-proofs
Paper structure: Section 2 introduces a simple language that we use for
the presentation of our ideas. Section 3 formally deﬁnes the forward intra-
procedural dataﬂow analyses and their correctness. Section 4 presents the
example of a constant propagation analysis. Section 5 presents our correctness
proof methodology. Sections 6 and 7 brieﬂy introduce Athena and describe
our experience in using it to prove the correctness of three related analyses.
Finally, Section 8 discusses related work, and Section 9 concludes.
1 There is also a third correctness condition that we explain later in the paper.
2 Essentially, a frame theorem is a reduced procedure speciﬁcation: e.g., a procedure does
not change the local variables of its caller.
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2 Program Representation and Semantics
This paper uses the following notation: S∗ is the set of all ﬁnite lists with
elements from the set S; S+ is similar to S∗, but contains only non-empty
lists. We write e : l for the list obtained by adding the element e at the head
of the list l. If f is a function A → B, f [a → b] is the function that behaves
exactly like f , except that f (a) = b. For each relation R ⊆ A× B, we write
a R b for (a, b) ∈ R; R∗ denotes the transitive and reﬂexive closure of R.
We present our ideas in the context of a simple language with recursive
procedures and local variables (however, the general proof methodology from
Section 5 is independent of this particular language). Figure 1 presents the
mathematical objects for the program representation and semantics. A pro-
gram P is a mapping from a subset of procedure names to the corresponding
procedures. Each procedure consists of a list of formal parameters and a list of
instructions. Instructions have the expected semantics; e.g., “v := ct” loads
the constant ct into the local variable v; “if(v == 0) goto a” jumps to the
a-th instruction from the current procedure, etc.
P ∈ Program = {P ′ ∈ A → Proc | A ⊆ ProcName, main ∈ A}
p ∈ ProcName procedure names
Proc = Var∗ × Instr∗
v ∈ Var local variables (including formal parameters)
Instr ::= v := ct | v1 := v2 | v := v1 bop v2
| if(v == 0) goto a
| v := call p (v0, v1, ..., vk−1) | return v
bop ∈ Bop = {+, -, *, mod, div, <,≤, >,≥, ==,∧,∨}
a ∈ N addresses inside a procedure
c ∈ State = Stack Concrete states
S ∈ Stack = (VState × Lab ×Var)
+
Execution stack
V ∈ VState = Var → Z State of local variables
lb ∈ Lab = ProcName × N Program labels
cinit = 〈λv.0, 〈main, 0〉, v0〉 Initial program state
Fig. 1. Program representation and semantics.
Each instruction has a label lb ∈ Lab = ProcName × N: 〈p, i〉 is the label
of the i-th instruction from the procedure named p. instrAtP (lb) denotes the
instruction from label lb in program P. For most instructions, control goes
from label lb = 〈p, a〉 to next (〈p, a〉) = 〈p, a + 1〉. For a jump instruction,
control can also go to the jump target. predP (lb) denotes the set of control ﬂow
predecessors of label lb , i.e., labels of the instructions that may be executed
right before executing the instruction from label lb .
The meaning of our programs is given by a small-step operational seman-
tics, informally called the concrete semantics. Currently, a concrete state con-
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tains only the execution stack. Each stack frame corresponds to a procedure
activation, and contains (1) the state of the local variables of the procedure,
(2) the current label inside the procedure, and (3) the caller variable that
will receive the returned value. The state of the local variables is a total
function from variables to integers; on procedure entry, parameters are ini-
tialized with the values of the actual arguments; all other local variables are
initialized to 0. 3 All variables have integer values; booleans are encoded as
integers in a C-like fashion. The auxiliary function pc takes a concrete state
c = 〈V, lb , vr〉 : Stail, and returns the label of the instruction about to be
executed, i.e., lb .
The execution of a program P starts with the ﬁrst instruction from the
distinguished procedure main, i.e., instrAtP (〈main, 0〉). An execution of P is
a (possibly inﬁnite) chain of transitions: cinit = c0 P c1 P . . . P ci P
ci+1 P , . . . . The transition ci P ci+1 executes the instruction at label
pc (ci) in program P, i.e., the instruction instrAtP (pc (ci)). The transition
relation P ⊆ State × State is deﬁned by a case analysis of the instruction
executed in that step. Here is a sample case:
〈V, lb , vr〉 : Stail P 〈V [v → ct] ,next (lb ) , vr〉 : Stail
where instrAtP (lb ) = “v := ct”.
[ldc]
3 Forward Intra-Procedural Dataﬂow Analyses
Deﬁnition 3.1 A forward intra-procedural dataﬂow analysis A is a function
that, for each program P, produces a tuple 〈LP, [[.]]P , A
init
P ,MP, AP〉, consisting
of:
(i) A property lattice LP, with a join operator unionsqLP and an induced ordering
relation LP (we ignore the subscript LP whenever it is obvious from the
context).
(ii) A family of monotonic transfer functions [[.]]P : LabP → LP → LP , where
LabP denotes the set of labels from program P. Intuitively, for each label
lb from P, [[lb ]]P takes the analysis fact for the program point before label
lb , and returns the analysis fact for the program point after label lb .
(iii) An initial analysis fact AinitP ∈ LP for the entry point of each procedure.
(iv) A modeling relation MP ⊆ State×LP ; c MP l iﬀ the analysis fact l ∈ LP
models the concrete state c.
(v) A function AP : LabP → LP , where LabP is the set of labels from P.
AP (lb) is the analysis fact for the program point right before label lb . AP
3 Only variables mentioned in the program can have a non-zero value; hence, the state of
the local variables has a ﬁnite representation.
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satisﬁes the dataﬂow equations:
∀lb ∈ LabP . AP (lb) 
8><
>>:
AinitP if lb = 〈p, 0〉
G
lb2∈predP (lb)
[[lb2]]P (AP (lb2)) otherwise
The dataﬂow equations simply state that for each procedure we start with
an initial analysis fact for the procedure entry point, and next use the transfer
functions to propagate this information along the control ﬂow graph; we use unionsq
in the control ﬂow join points. Strongly connected components in the control
ﬂow graph require ﬁxed-points. The dataﬂow equations use , instead of
equality, to allow aggresive ﬁxed-point approximations like widening [8].
We are now ready to deﬁne the correctness of an analysis. We ﬁrst intro-
duce a predicate to identify the reachable program states, the only states the
analysis cares about:




Deﬁnition 3.3 [Analysis Correctness] Consider a forward intra-procedural
analysis A that assigns to each program P the tuple 〈LP, [[.]]P , A
init
P ,MP, AP〉,
as required by Def. 3.1. Analysis A is correct iﬀ
∀P ∈ Program . ∀c ∈ State . reachableP (c) → c MP AP (pc (c))
In plain English, for each reachable concrete state c, pc (c) represents the
program point reached by the program execution (i.e., the label of the in-
struction about to be executed); the analysis correctness condition requires
that the analysis result for pc (c), i.e., AP (pc (c)), models the concrete state
c, with respect to the intended modeling relation MP .
4 Example: Constant Propagation
Preliminaries: If A is a set, L = Lift〈A〉 is the lattice with the elements ,
⊥, lift (x) for any x ∈ A, and the following ordering relation: ⊥ is smaller
than any element, any element is smaller than , and distinct elements of L
are otherwise incomparable. Formally,
l1 	L l2
def
↔ (l1 =⊥L) ∨ (l2 = L) ∨ (l1 = l2)
l1 unionsqL ⊥= l1; ⊥ unionsqL l2 = l2; l unionsqL l = l; otherwise, l1 unionsqL l2 = 
If A is a set and B is a lattice, F = A → B is a lattice with the following
element-wise ordering relation and join operator:
f1 	F f2
def
↔ ∀a ∈ A. f1 (a) 	B f2 (a) f1 unionsqF f2 = λa. f1 (a) unionsqB f2 (a)
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↔ ∃V ∈ VState. ∃lb ∈ Lab. ∃vr ∈ N. ∃Stail ∈ Stack .
(c = 〈V, lb , vr〉 : Stail) ∧
(∀v ∈ VarP . (m(v) = ) ∨ (m(v) = lift (V (v)))
Initial Analysis Fact for Procedure Entry Points: AinitP = λv. .
Transfer Functions:
instrAtP (lb) [[lb ]]P(m)
v := ct m [v → lift (ct)]
v1 := v2 m [v1 → m (v2)]
v := v1 bop v2 m [v → ]
v := call p (v0, ..., vk−1) λv
′. 
otherwise (if and return) m (unchanged)
Fig. 2. Speciﬁcation of a simple constant propagation analysis.
Constant Propagation: Figure 2 presents the speciﬁcation of the constant
propagation analysis. The property lattice for the constant propagation anal-
ysis is M = VarP → Lift〈Z〉, where VarP is the set of all variables from the
program P. For each label lb , the constant propagation analysis computes a
function m that maps each local variable to ⊥, , or lift (x) , x ∈ Z. The mod-
eling relation (also presented in Fig. 2), requires that for each local variable v
with the value V (v) = x in the concrete state, m (v) is either  (that approx-
imates all values), or lift (x). Therefore, if m (v) = lift (x) and the analysis is
correct (according to Def. 3.3), we know that in any reachable execution state
at label lb , v has the value x. A program optimization can use this guarantee
to safely replace any use of v at label lb with the constant x.
The transfer functions map v to “lift (ct)” for a “v := ct” instruction
and propagate constants across “v1 := v2” copy instructions. The transfer
functions for binary operations and for calls are very conservative; we discuss
more precise transfer functions in Section 7.
5 Analysis Correctness Proof Methodology
This section presents three analysis-speciﬁc conditions. As we prove in Theo-
rem 5.2, these conditions are suﬃcient for correctness.
Condition 1 Upper approximations preserve the modeling relation: 4
4 This corresponds to our choice that in the property lattice smaller should mean “more
precise” and bigger should mean “safer” (the opposite choice is also possible). Here is a
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∀P ∈ Program. ∀c ∈ State . ∀l1, l2 ∈ LP .
reachableP (c) ∧ (c MP l1) ∧ (l1  l2) → (c MP l2)
Condition 2 Initial analysis facts are correct:
∀P ∈ Program. ∀c ∈ State . ∀p ∈ ProcName.
reachableP (c) ∧ (pc (c) = 〈p, 0〉) → c MP A
init
P
The next condition uses the intra-procedural transition relation P ;P is
similar to the transition relationP except that, in the case of a call instruc-
tion, P relates the program states before and after the call by “skipping”
over all the instructions from the invoked procedure and its transitive callees.
Condition 3 Commuting diagram (instructions preserve modeling):
∀P ∈ Program. ∀c1, c2 ∈ State . ∀l ∈ LP.
reachableP (c1) ∧ (c1 MP l) ∧ (c1 P c2) → c2 MP [[pc (c1)]]P(l)
Deﬁnition 5.1 c1 P c2 iﬀ one of the following conditions is true:
(i) The instruction about to be executed in c1 is not a call or a return
instruction, and c1 P c2; OR
(ii) The instruction about to be executed in c1 is a call, and c2 is the concrete
state immediately after the return from that call, i.e.,




cb) ∧ (cb P c2) ∧ (|c1| = |c2|)
where c kP c
′ def↔ (c P c
′) ∧ (|c| ≥ k) ∧ (|c ′| ≥ k)
|c| denotes the height of the stack in state c
In plain English, ca is the state immediately after call, cb is the state immedi-
ately before the return from the invoked procedure, and none of the transitions
between ca and cb return from the invoked procedure, i.e., all transitions from
ca to cb keep the stack at least as high as the stack from ca.
Note: Condition 3 can be further split into simpler parts, by specializing it
for each kind of instructions.
The next theorem is our only paper-and-pencil proof and shows that con-
ditions 1, 2, and 3 are suﬃcient for the correctness of our analysis:
Theorem 5.2 If an analysis A satisﬁes conditions 1, 2, and 3, then A is
correct.
deﬁnition of these terms: according to MP , an analysis fact l ∈ LP models several concrete
states. The fewer states l models, the more precise and less safe l is.
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Proof. Let’s pick an arbitrary program P, and an arbitrary state c ∈ State,
such that reachableP (c). We shall prove that c MP AP (pc (c)).
Let pc (c) = 〈p, a〉, i.e., c is about to execute the a-th instruction from
the p-th procedure. As c is reachable, there exists an execution cinit = c0 P
c1 P . . . P ck = c. Let s be the largest i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that |ci| = |ck|,
and |ci−1| = |ck| − 1, or 0 if no such i exists. In both cases, cs is the concrete
state right at the beginning of procedure p’s invocation that c is still executing.
The chain of transitions cs P cs+1 P . . . P ck contains: (1) transitions
for the instructions from procedure p, and (2) transitions for the instructions
from procedures invoked by p. We “skip” over the latter transitions by using
the intra-procedural transition relation: cs = cs0 P cs1 P . . . P cst = ck.
Each transition csi P csi+1 corresponds to either (1) a non-call instruction
from procedure p, or (2) a call from p to a procedure p ′, the instructions from
p ′ and its transitive callees, and the return back into p.
We prove by induction that ∀i. 0 ≤ i ≤ t → csi MP AP (pc (csi)), and
next instantiate i with t to prove the ﬁnal result.
Base case: i = 0. As cs0 = cs is the state at the beginning of p, AP (pc (cs0)) 
AinitP (see dataﬂow equations in Deﬁnition 3.1). By Condition 2, cs0 MP A
init
P .
By Condition 1, cs0 MP AP (pc (cs0)).
Induction step: Suppose csi MP AP (pc (csi)), and let



















. This completes our proof. 
Additional proofs: This paper is focused on partial correctness. So far, we
did not discuss the proofs that LP is really a lattice, nor the proof of ter-
mination. Usually, LP is obtained by standard lattice constructors: e.g., the
product of two lattices, the powerset of a set, etc., that are guaranteed to
produce a lattice. For termination, we have to prove that LP does not have
any inﬁnite ascending chain (usually proven by a ﬁniteness argument), and
that all transfer functions are monotonic.
Backward analyses: Our methodology can easily be adapted to handle
backward analyses too: Condition 2 will refer to the procedure exit points,
and Condition 3 will propagate the modeling relation “backward:”
∀P ∈ Program. ∀c1, c2 ∈ State. ∀l ∈ LP .
reachableP (c1) ∧ (c2 MP l) ∧ (c1 P c2) → c1 MP [[pc (c1)]]P(l)
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6 Brief Description of Athena
Athena [4, 3] is a new interactive theorem prover for multi-sorted ﬁrst-order
logic that has facilities for structured proof representation and proof checking,
automated theorem proving, and model generation. Athena also provides a
Scheme-like higher-order functional programming language, and a proof ab-
straction mechanism for expressing arbitrarily complicated inference meth-
ods in a way that guarantees soundness, akin to the tactics and tacticals of
LCF-style systems such as HOL [11] and Isabelle [20]. Proof automation is
achieved in two ways: ﬁrst, through user-formulated proof methods; and sec-
ond, through the seamless integration of state-of-the-art ATPs such as Vam-
pire [26] and Spass [27] as primitive black boxes for general reasoning. For
proof representation and checking, Athena uses a block-structured Fitch-style
natural deduction [21] calculus with novel syntactic constructs and a formal
semantics based on the abstraction of assumption bases [2].
The assumption base contains the propositions that are known to be valid
at a speciﬁc point in the proof. Each (sub)proof adds the proven proposition
to the assumption base. To prove propositions of the form P1 → P2, Athena
provides special constructs that add P1 to the assumption base during the
dynamic scope of P2’s proof. A proof consists of either the application of
primitive inference rules (i.e., modus ponens), or the invocation of an external
ATP. If the external ATP does not succeed in a certain time bound, we do a
few steps of the proof, and next try the ATP again on a simpler proposition.
Common proofs can be abstracted into user-deﬁned methods.
Among other applications, Athena has been used to implement parts of
a proof-emitting optimizing compiler [16] and to verify the core operations
of a Unix-like ﬁle system [5]. [4] contains a list of applications, along with a
tutorial on Athena’s syntax and semantics.
7 Experience
We used Athena to formalize and prove the correctness of three related dataﬂow
analyses. For each analysis, we proved the three conditions from Section 5 and
the monotonicity of the transfer functions.
The ﬁrst analysis is the simple constant propagation analysis from Sec-
tion 4. The second analysis extends constant propagation with constant fold-
ing: The transfer function for a “v := v1 bop v2” statement computes the
result of the binary operation if the analysis already knows that both operands
are constants. The third analysis improves over the second one by using a more
precise transfer function for call statements of the form “v := call p (...)”
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that maps only v to  (instead of all local variables). The correctness proof
of the third analysis requires the proof of a frame condition, stating that the
execution of the transitively invoked procedures do not change the caller’s
local variables, except for the variable that stores the result of the call.
The table below presents an overview of the formalization and proof ef-
fort (including the proofs of all intermediate results, e.g., the frame condition).
During the proofs for the simple constant propagation, the language formaliza-
tion went though several debugging and simpliﬁcation iterations. Therefore,
it is impossible to separate the time spent on the ﬁrst two entries below.
Formalization Proofs Total Human
[# non-commented, non-empty lines] Eﬀort
Language + semantics 457 164 621 15 days
Simple ct. propagation 174 262 436 (together)
+ constant folding +50 +71 +121 3 hours
+ more precise transfer
function for call
+4 +685 +689 5 days
The rest of this section gives a brief overview of our work in Athena.
Our correctness conditions are universally quantiﬁed over all programs. To
prove them, we pick one unknown program P, formalize the structure of P,
its semantics, and the analysis for P, and prove (in Athena) the correctness
conditions instantiated for P; next, we generalize over P.
We introduce Athena sorts (similar to types in a programming language)
for the sets from the program representation and semantics. We also intro-
duce function symbols; each relation/predicate is modeled as a function with
boolean values. For each function, we declare its signature and a few axioms.
The signatures allows Athena to do Hindley-Milner-like sort-inference.
Language formalization: We formalize the program structure and seman-
tics only once for all the analyses. We declare the sort VarP for P’s variables
(i.e., the set VarP ), the sort ProcNameP for P’s procedure names, and the sort
Instr for instructions. 5 The analyzed program is declared as an (uninter-
preted) function from procedure names to procedures:
(domain VarP) # Sort: variables from P.
(domain ProcNameP) # Sort: procedure names in P.
(declare main ProcNameP) # Name of the main procedure (element of the sort ProcNameP)
(datatype Instr # Sort: instructions from P.
5 There are several Athena keywords for introducing sorts. The simplest is domain;
datatype/structure introduce a sort too, but they also introduce function symbols for
the datatype constructors; a structural induction mechanism; axioms stating that each el-
ement of the sort is obtained by using a constructor; and, in the case of datatype, axioms
stating that the domain is freely generated. For non-datatype domains, the user can specify
a diﬀerent equality relation.
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(ldc VarP Num) # Constructors correspond to different
(copy VarP VarP) # kinds of instructions.
...)
(datatype Proc # Sort: procedures; one procedure = list of parameters +
(proc (List-Of VarP) (List-Of Instr))) # list of instructions.
(declare P (-> (ProcNameP) Proc)) # The analyzed program.
The formalization of the operational semantics introduces additional sorts,
axioms for the transition relation step (i.e.,P), and many auxiliary axioms.
The Athena code closely matches the deﬁnitions from Section 2 (except that
Athena uses preﬁx notation):
(datatype StackFrame (stackFrame VState Label VarP)) # VState, Label definitions ommited.
(datatype State (state (List-Of StackFrame)))
# ...
(declare step (-> (State State) Boolean)) # Operational semantics transition relation.
(define step-axiom-ldc # Axiom: transitions for "v := ct" statements.
# Identifiers starting with "?" denote variables in the object logic.
(forall ?vstate ?label ?vr ?tail ?cs2 ?v ?n
(let ((cs1 (state (Cons (stackFrame ?vstate ?label ?vr) ?tail))))
(if (currentInstr cs1 (ldc ?v ?n))
(iff (step cs1 ?cs2)




(assert step-axiom-ldc) # Add this axiom to the assumption base.
Analysis formalization: We introduce a polymorphic sort for lattices of
the form Lift〈S〉 (that can be instantiated for any set S), and a sort for the
analysis lattice VarP → Lift〈Z〉; for each sort, we deﬁne the corresponding
ordering relations:
# Sort: polymorphic datatype for lifted domains
(datatype (Lift S)
bottomLift (lift S) topLift)
# Definition of orderLift ommited for brevity.
# Sort for the analysis lattice. To encode VarP → Lift〈Z〉 in the first-order logic
# of Athena, we use a representation similar to a list of association pairs.
(structure M
allTop # allTop encodes λv. 
(updateM M VarP (Lift Num))) # (updateM m v x) encodes m [v 	→ x]
# The axioms for updateM (ommited for brevity) state that (lookUpM ?x ?m) returns the
# first association for ?x in the mapping ?m, or topLift if no such association exists.
# Order relation for the analysis lattice.
(declare orderM (-> (M M) Boolean))
(define orderM-axiom
(forall ?m1 ?m2
(iff (orderM ?m1 ?m2)
(forall ?x (orderLift (lookUpM ?x ?m1)
(lookUpM ?x ?m2))))))
The deﬁnitions for the modeling relation and the transfer functions closely
correspond to the deﬁnitions from Section 4. The predicate (model c m)
holds iﬀ c MP m; similarly, (tf lb m1 m2) holds iﬀ [[lb ]]P(m1) = m2.
Proofs: We prove the ﬁrst two correctness conditions automatically, using
Athena’s interface to Vampire [26]. Cond. 2 is the easiest: Vampire proves
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that Cond. 2 follows from the set of all axioms; for Cond. 1, we had to pass
only a subset of the axioms (Vampire takes too much time if we give it the
full set of axioms). Condition 3 requires signiﬁcantly more eﬀort. The Athena
deﬁnition of Cond. 3 closely follows the deﬁnition from Section 5:
(define commuting-diagram # Condition 3.
(forall ?cs1 ?cs2 ?m1 ?m2 ?lab
(if (and wfProg # Analyzed progran is well-formed; e.g., no invalid jumps.
(reachableState ?cs1) # reachableP (?cs1)
(model ?cs1 ?m1) # ?cs1 MP ?m1
(ipStep ?cs1 ?cs2) # ?cs1 P ?cs2
(pc ?cs1 ?lab) # pc (?cs1) = ?lab
(tf ?lab ?m1 ?m2)) # [[?lab]]P(?m1) = ?m2
(model ?cs2 ?m2)))) # ?cs2 MP ?m2
To prove commuting-diagram, we perform a case analysis on the instruction
from ?lab, and prove each case as a separate theorem. The modeling rela-
tion requires a certain condition to hold for each local variable v (see Fig. 2);
accordingly, most of the proofs do a case analysis on whether v is the vari-
able being modiﬁed by the instruction or not. The proofs are a combina-
tion of manual and automatic sub-proofs. The full proofs are available from
http://www.cag.lcs.mit.edu/∼salcianu/df-proofs.
8 Related Work
Compiler correctness has always been an active research area. Other re-
searchers [17, 23] presented correctness conditions for the traditional abstract
interpretation framework — e.g., U-closure — that are similar to those from
Section 5. Wand et al. [12] completed a paper-and-pencil correctness proof
for an entire Scheme compiler; small parts of the proof were later formalized
in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle [7]. The compiler examined in [12]
consists mostly of syntax-directed conversion steps. By comparison, we focus
on machine-checkable correctness proofs for dataﬂow analyses.
The Veriﬁx project [10] uses program checkers to dynamically check the
correct compilation of a given program. Formal methods can later be used
to prove the correctness of the program checkers. 6 The Credible Compila-
tion framework [22, 16] allows a compiler optimization to output, in addition
to the optimized program, a proof that the optimized program is semanti-
cally equivalent to the original one. The proof can be checked by a small
trusted proof checker; if the proof does not check, the compiler can simply ig-
nore the problematic optimization. The Translation Validation Infrastructure
(TVI) [18] attempts to accomplish the same goals as Credible Compilation,
6 Space restrictions prevent us from discussing other research directions from the Veriﬁx
project. However, we would like to mention that [28] uses a combination of manual and
computer-assisted proofs to show the correctness of compiler back-ends.
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but without any assistance from the compiler. TVI attempts to discover an
equivalence proof (instead of just checking a proof produced by the compiler).
When applied to optimization stages of the GNU C Compiler compiling real
applications, TVI generates many simulation invariants and the custom-built
theorem prover manages to prove almost, but not all of them. 7 A parallel,
similar project, Translation Validation, succeeded in handling several aggres-
sive optimizations that do not preserve the program loop structure [29].
The correct assumption behind the aforementioned four projects is that
it is much easier to check the correctness of an optimization on a particular
program than for all programs. Also, these approaches can detect errors in the
implementation of conceptually correct analyses. Still, we believe that proving
the correctness of an analysis for all possible programs is very important for
the high-level design of the analysis, and can be a useful complement for
translation validation approaches.
Cobalt [14] is a framework for deﬁning syntax-directed analyses and opti-
mizations. Cobalt requires the analysis designer to specify an analysis invari-
ant, and next uses the theorem prover Simplify [9] to prove the correctness
of the optimizations. However, Cobalt does not deal with classical dataﬂow
analyses: It does not allow the deﬁnition of analysis property lattices, transfer
functions, etc. Instead, Cobalt supports analyses expressed as reachability
conditions on the control ﬂow graph. 8
Very close to our research is the work from [13] and [6]. [13] presents
a correctness proof in Isabelle [20] for the Java Bytecode Veriﬁer (that in-
cludes a dataﬂow analysis for computing the stack typing at various program
points); [6] presents a constructive proof in Coq [25] for a dataﬂow analysis
for JavaCard Bytecode. Both of these papers present work of excellent qual-
ity, and the complete resulting proofs are available online. They diﬀer from
our work in several respects. First, we place a heavier emphasis on proof
readability. We aim at allowing analysis designers to write readable proofs,
structurally similar to the ones they would write on paper, but with the ad-
vantage of machine-checkability; we invite the interested readers to contrast
our proofs (in terms of readability) with the proofs from [13] and [6]. Second,
Athena allows signiﬁcant automation that reduces the overall proof eﬀort.
This is done through user-deﬁned tactics and and through the seamless in-
7 E.g., as explained in [18, Section 6], for the case of gcc compiling itself, 3.5% of the
constraints generated for the common-subexpression-elimination (CSE) optimization are
not simpliﬁed, i.e., automatically proven by the theorem prover.
8 A recent publication [15] describes Rhodium, a successor of Cobalt that allows the deﬁni-
tion of dataﬂow analyses that use a restricted lattice (a powerset of all user-deﬁned analysis
facts). Our work aims at proving correctness of dataﬂow analyses that use a wider range of
lattices.
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tegration of state-of-the-art automated theorem provers. To the best of our
knowledge, the oﬃcial versions of Coq and Isabelle are not interfaced with
external ATPs yet. Third, we are more focused on the presentation of a clear
framework for proving the correctness of a broad class of dataﬂow analyses,
instead of getting very focused on one speciﬁc analysis.
9 Conclusion
This paper presents our experience with dataﬂow analysis correctness proofs
in the interactive theorem prover Athena. Our experience indicates that such
proofs are possible, and that modern automated theorem provers increase the
level of automation. Still, the state-of-the-art in theorem proving is very far
from full automation, and signiﬁcant human eﬀort is required.
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